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Terrestrial Sources of X-Ray Radiation and Their Effects on NASA Flight Hardware 
 
Scott Kniffin, Orbital Sciences, NASA GSFC 
 
X-rays are an energetic and penetrating form of ionizing electromagnetic radiation, which can degrade NASA flight 
hardware.  The main concern posed by such radiation is degradation of active electronic devices and, in some cases, 
diodes.  Non-electronic components are only damaged at doses that far exceed the point where any electronic device 
would be destroyed.  For the purposes of this document, flight hardware can be taken to mean an entire instrument, 
the flight electronics within the instrument or the individual microelectronic devices in the flight electronics. This 
document will discuss and describe the ways in which NASA flight hardware might be exposed to x-rays, what is 
and isn’t a concern, and how to tell the difference. 
 
First, we must understand what components in flight hardware may be vulnerable to degradation or failure as a 
result of being exposed to ionizing radiation, such as x-rays.  As stated above, bulk materials (structural metals, 
plastics, etc.) are generally only affected by ionizing radiation at very high dose levels.  Likewise, passive electronic 
components (e.g. resistors, capacitors, most diodes) are strongly resistant to exposure to x-rays, except at very high 
doses.  The main concerns arise when active components, that is, components like discrete transistors and 
microelectronic devices, are exposed to ionizing radiation.  Active components are designed to respond to minute 
changes in currents and voltages in the circuit.  As such, it is not surprising that exposure to ionizing radiation, 
which creates ionized and therefore electrically active particles, may degrade the way the hardware performs.  For 
the most part, the mechanism for this degradation is trapping of the charges generated by ionizing radiation by 
defects in dielectric materials in the hardware.  As such, the degree of damage is a function of both the quantity of 
ionizing radiation exposure and the physical characteristics of the hardware itself.   
 
The metric that describes the level of exposure to ionizing radiation is total ionizing dose (TID).  The unit of TID is 
the rad, which is defined as 100 ergs absorbed per gram of material.  Dose can be expressed in other units, for 
example grays (gy), where 1 gy = 100 rads. The actual fluence of radiation needed to deliver a rad depends on the 
absorbing material, so units of dose are usually stated in reference to the material of interest.  That is, for 
microelectronic devices, the unit of dose is generally rad (Si) or rad (SiO2).  However, the definition of absorbed 
dose in this fashion has the advantage that the type of radiation causing the ionization can be normalized so that a 
realistic and adequate comparison can be made.  The sensitivity of microelectronic parts to TID varies over many 
orders of magnitude.  (Note:  Doses to humans are typically expressed in rems—or roentgen-equivalent-man—
which measures tissue damage, and depends on the type of radiation, as well as the dose in rads.)   
 
Thus far, the “softest” parts tested at NASA showed damage at 500 rads (Si), while parts that are radiation-hardened 
by design can remain functional to doses on the order of 107 rads (Si).  This broad range of sensitivity highlights one 
of the most important considerations when considering the effects of radiation on electronic parts:  In order to 
determine whether a radiation exposure is a concern for a particular part, one must understand the technologies used 
in the part and their vulnerabilities to TID damage.  A NASA radiation expert should be consulted to obtain such 
information.   
 
For NASA missions, the space radiation environment is carefully calculated to determine the dose that mission is 
likely to see during the mission duration.  For a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission, for example 600 km at 28 latitude, 
the dose for its orbit under 100 mils of aluminum shielding (typical for hardware shielded only by the spacecraft’s 
outer surface and electronics housing) is 2 krads (Si) in 3 years.  For equivalent shielding in a mission at 
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), the dose would typically be around 100 krads (Si) over the same period.  Typically, a 
device must exhibit little or moderate degradation after such an exposure (or, more typically, twice such an exposure 
including margin for part-to-part variation and radiation-environment variability) if one is to be certain that the 
device will fulfill its intended function as desired.   
 
Since any terrestrial dose given to a device prior to launch reduces the margin, it is advantageous to minimize such 
exposures.  In human radiation protection, the concept for limiting the dose received is known as ALARA, or “as 
low as reasonably achievable”.  The key word in this concept is, of course, reasonable.  The person responsible for 
the flight hardware should be aware of testing, qualification and screening procedures to be done for their flight 
hardware and whether these procedures involve exposure to x-rays or other radiation sources to the parts that will 
actually fly.  This person must know what is reasonable and endeavor keep the dose ALARA.  This screening and 
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qualification should not be confused with radiation lot acceptance testing (RLAT) which may be done on a subset of 
the flight lot to determine its radiation tolerance.  Devices subjected to RLAT are selected from the same lot date 
code as the flight devices, but will not be flown, as RLAT is an intentionally destructive test whereas x-ray 
inspections are a part of the non-destructive evaluation of flight parts.    
 
As seen in the examples above, there is quite a range of doses that might be seen, depending on the mission.  As 
described above, some of the most sensitive devices could show degradation or significant probability of failure 
after as little as 500 rads (Si).  If there were a compelling reason, (e.g. it’s the only device that can do the job) a part 
this sensitive could be used in an experiment for a space shuttle flight, provided that it were well shielded, but it 
would never be considered for a longer duration mission due to the extreme risk of failure.  In the case of cutting-
edge technology, state-of-the-art commercial off-the-shelf (SOTA COTS) parts may be used on missions and are 
(hopefully) tested for radiation tolerance to make sure that they meet the mission TID requirement, given the orbit 
and duration of that mission.  It is imperative that those responsible for the hardware be aware of what devices he or 
she has, and how sensitive they are in order to make informed, reasonable decisions about what is happening, or will 
happen to that hardware.   
 
It is necessary to understand what happens to a device that is exposed.  The entire spectrum of effects from no 
detectable damage to device destruction is possible depending on how, when, where, and by what, the device is 
exposed to x-rays.  A dose might be so small that there is no detectable effect on the device.  An exposure might 
lead to some quantifiable level of device performance degradation in terms of its electrical specifications or 
performance of its intended function up to and including complete device failure.  It is even possible for physical 
damage, both external as well as internal, to occur if the dose is significant enough.  The energy and output of an x-
ray machine is tailored to the intended function of that machine from scanning small boxes to a radiograph of an 
entire tractor-trailer and everything in between.  The families of x-ray machines described below are the ones most 
likely to be encountered by NASA personnel with flight hardware.   
 
In order to better quantify the risk associated with each type of x-ray machine, a risk assessment method detailed in 
MIL-STD-882C will be used here.  After an assessment of the severity and probability of occurrence of a given risk 
are determined, the result then generates a Hazard Risk Index (HRI) with the following definitions: 
HRI1 – Unacceptable 
HRI2 – Undesirable 
HRI3 – Acceptable with Controls 
HRI4 – Acceptable 
Per MIL-STD-882C, items with an index of 4 are acceptable without review.  Risks with and index of 3 require 
some level of review to ensure that the risk is dealt with properly and will not affect safety.  At an index of 2, a 
significant review of the procedures to be followed must be done to determine if the risk outweighs the benefit.  
Additionally, one must determine what the effect of accepting that risk will be, or do to, the project.  An index of 1 
is exactly that: unacceptable in all but the most extreme of cases and even then it should only be considered as a last 
resort.  This is because, in all probability, an HRI1 risk will result in catastrophic failure.   
 
Please keep in mind that any radiation producing equipment used in a manner inconsistent with its intended function 
or used in an inappropriate manner (e.g. in violation of the established operating procedures for that equipment) 
could always result in a HRI1 condition.  The following assessment provides the risk if the equipment is used as it is 
intended by the proper personnel.   
 
A table of x-ray equipment used at NASA Centers and Facilities, including their HRI, is included at the end of this 
document.   
 
Airport carry-on baggage, checked baggage screening and mailroom package screening x-ray machines 
The rapid throughput and response of these machines automatically reduces x-ray exposure, so these x-ray machines 
are typically the least likely to cause damage to flight hardware.  These systems are HRI4.  Usually, these systems 
use an image intensifier, which allows the use of a small fluence of very energetic x-rays, while still delivering 
quality data to the operator.  The image intensifier typically has a gain of two to four orders of magnitude, reducing 
exposure of the target by a commensurate factor.  For example, the package x-ray system installed in the NASA 
GSFC receiving department in October 2001 delivers a dose of only about 135 rads per pass.  This is a little more 
than a tenth the amount received per day from naturally occurring radiation sources.  Due to the size and complexity 
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of the items being scanned, airport checked baggage x-ray systems have a slightly higher typical dose per pass than 
systems designed for smaller items.  For security reasons, exact numbers are not available at this time but the new 
checked baggage screening equipment at Baltimore-Washington International airport (BWI) typically delivers a 
dose of only a few mrads per pass.  The doses delivered by these x-ray screening systems are generally negligible 
and as such, are consistent with the ALARA principle.  It is reasonable to check flight hardware for transport via a 
commercial air carrier, because there is little likelihood of damage to devices intended for space flight.  However, 
items being shipped as cargo will be subject to a tomographic x-ray inspection after January 2003 at international 
airports throughout the United States.  See the discussion on tomography below for the hazard associated with this 
inspection method.  In the case of commercial cargo carriers, it is strongly advised that a call be placed to the 
specific carrier to determine if the hardware will be x-ray inspected prior to shipping.    
 
In marked contrast to the above screening devices the high-energy electron accelerator devices used to sterilize mail 
delivered to the 202xx through 205xx ZIP Codes in Washington D.C. pose a most severe radiation hazard.  NASA 
Headquarters is in this zone, though technically, shipping and receiving for NASA HQ is not.  It should be assumed 
that items shipped to NASA HQ would be irradiated.  A sterilization dose is as much as 9 to 12 orders of magnitude 
greater than an inspection dose. The sterilization of mail by electron irradiation has resulted in the destruction of all 
electronic parts and media that have been subjected to it.  This includes laptop computers, cameras, film, computer 
memory, floppy disks and other storage media.  It can even damage paper.  At the time of writing it is not advised to 
send flight hardware through the United States Postal Service in these ZIP codes, since the hardware will likely be 
badly damaged or destroyed.  Alternative carriers or delivery mechanisms are required, as this method of delivery 
would clearly be HRI1.    
 
Micro-focus/real-time, and screening photographic x-ray systems  
This category of screening systems encompasses a very broad range of applications and x-ray source intensities.  
There is also a significant human factor involved with the use of this equipment.  The x-ray systems discussed in this 
section are commonly used at NASA centers for the inspection of flight electronics ranging in complexity from 
individual microelectronic components up to full flight boards.  Common to all of these systems is the ability to 
change x-ray energy and intensity to accommodate the sheer range of inspections that must be performed—anything 
from looking at bond wires in tiny plastic encapsulated microcircuits to looking for cracks in a heavy copper feed-
through.  Generally, as the density and size of an object increases, so must the energy and intensity in order to get 
sufficient resolution in the image.  It is here that the human factor, in the form of experience, enters the picture.   
 
It is incumbent upon the operator of x-ray equipment of these types know what is being exposed, and how to best go 
about getting the information with the least dose possible.  A well trained, experienced operator will know how his 
or her x-ray system operates and what is likely to be the minimum necessary energy and intensity needed to get the 
information requested.  A poorly trained or inexperienced operator, guessing at energies and intensities or taking 
several minutes to get the desired image, can deliver dose levels on the order of krads (Si) to sensitive parts.  The 
right type of experience is also important.  An operator who has not previously worked with microelectronic 
devices—or even particular technologies—may not be aware of their radiation damage susceptibility.  For example, 
an operator familiar with the real-time x-ray inspection of entire automobiles would have a non-trivial learning 
curve when transitioning to electronics inspection methods.  For example, the group responsible for the operation of 
the micro-focus/real-time x-ray systems at NASA GSFC has several decades of experience collectively, and knows 
to minimize the dose by minimizing exposure time and optimizing x-ray energy and intensity for the task at hand.  If 
the devices are sent to an outside facility for analysis, it is incumbent upon the person responsible to ensure that the 
x-ray facility personnel have sufficient training and experience to obtain good results while minimizing the radiation 
exposure of the hardware.   
 
Inadequate test planning or improper use of an x-ray system can result in considerable damage to flight electronics.  
For example, the micro-focus/real-time x-ray system used at NASA GSFC can deliver nearly 230 rads/minute (Si) in 
its most powerful configuration.  A second feature of these x-ray machines is that the x-ray beam is on the order of 
microns near the source and spreads to a few tens of centimeters far from the x-ray aperture (the closer the device is 
to the source, the greater the magnification).  Thus, exposure to the beam near the aperture can cause significant and 
very localized damage that could result in a pernicious and difficult to detect localized failure, leaving the rest of the 
device functional.   
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The keys to avoiding such failures are careful risk-benefit analysis and careful planning of the x-ray observations.  
The likely exposure of the part needs to be weighed against both the expected mission dose and the benefits of the 
observations.  In some cases, x-ray observations are the only method available to determine if a device already 
mounted to a board is defective.  Moreover, in most cases, operators that routinely do parts inspection for NASA 
projects already know what to expect just by looking at the package.  However, it is up to the person responsible to 
be aware of anything unusual about a given part so that x-ray operators can be alerted to any special circumstances 
and good results can be obtained while minimizing damage to flight hardware.  Taking all of the above review into 
consideration will result in a HRI3 condition.   
 
Photographic x-ray systems  
Photographic x-ray inspection of devices is routinely used for screening flight devices or boards.  Generally, the 
high sensitivity of photographic film means that the dose necessary to properly expose the film is very low 
compared to any mission requirement.  This serves to limit the dose more than anything else, as any significant 
exposure to x rays will cause the film to darken past the point where it can be interpreted.  Because there is no image 
intensifier, the x-rays have to be of higher energy and intensity to achieve the best results.  The worst case scenario 
for parts screening of thick metal packages results in a dose of approximately 42 rads (Si) per photographic x-ray, 
but most devices typically receive a dose within the range of 1.1 to 12.6 rads (Si) per photographic x-ray.  This is 
usually less than a real time x-ray and is certainly reasonable for the information gained.  It is important that the 
operator know to take the fewest x-rays necessary to properly screen the devices—experienced operators will 
already know to do this.  However, it is necessary for the person responsible for the parts to inform the x-ray system 
operator of any parts or boards that are unusual so that a special effort can be made to minimize the exposures while 
still obtaining the necessary data.  This may be essential to keeping the dose to a reasonable level.  Again, taking all 
of the above review into consideration will result in a HRI3 condition.   
 
Tomographic x-ray systems  
Because of the process used, this type of imaging poses the greatest possibility for damage to hardware.  In order to 
get the resolution or detail typical in a tomographic inspection, a tomographic image is composed by overlapping 
anywhere from several dozen (human use) to as many as 900 (industrial use) individual x-ray exposures along a 
certain plane.  While this results in incredibly detailed cross sectional images, it can also result in significant dose 
levels.  Unfortunately, the Department of Transportation has authorized the use of tomography units for certain large 
checked baggage and all civilian passenger aircraft cargo screening.  These units are expected to be commonplace 
after January 2003 as part of the mandate to inspect all checked baggage.  As this becomes standard practice, it will 
be necessary to secure another means of transport for large flight items that would be shipped as cargo aboard a 
civilian air carrier.  For the most part, NASA flies its own hardware or ships it via a NASA/Government owned 
truck and would not be subject to this type of inspection.  It should be recognized that a tomographic inspection of 
flight hardware electronics would represent a HRI1 condition for all foreseeable conditions unless the item is 
completely shielded by a significant quantity of lead.  One could legitimately expect this to cause a serious problem 
at an airport under the current atmosphere of security.  At this time, shippers that exclusively fly commercial cargo 
(no civilian passengers) are permitted to determine if x-ray screening is necessary for their business.  Several 
shippers do not x-ray their cargo.  Those individuals responsible for shipping flight hardware via a commercial 
cargo shipper must ensure that the hardware will not be subjected to x-ray inspection prior to shipping via that 
carrier.  If the carrier is using x-rays, you must assume that they will use a tomographic inspection method (HRI1) 
and another option must be found.  There should be no exceptions to this rule.   
 
A Summary of Other X-ray Producing Equipment 
There are several types of x-ray producing equipment that should never come into contact with flight hardware 
electronics but are present at NASA centers.  These machines are listed so that there is awareness of them and to 
prevent possible inappropriate use of such devices.   
 
Nearly every Center has scanning electron microscopes (SEMs).  SEMs have been a primary tool in microanalysis 
for many years and are known to generate x-rays from the electrons striking metal in or on the target.  The dose due 
to x-rays is trivial, the primary form of damage would come from localized damage from the electrons themselves if 
left exposed for a significant period of time.  SEMs are used as an analytical tool for destructive physical analysis 
(DPA).  Since no part subjected to DPA will actually fly aboard a spacecraft, SEMs used as they are intended should 
not be considered a threat to flight hardware.  SEMs would represent a HRI2 condition were they used to examine 
flight hardware. 
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X-ray crystallography units are solely used to study the lattice spacing in the crystals of solids.  There is no reason to 
put any semi-conductor device into a crystallography unit.  It is possible that the exact crystal structure of a 
scattering or defraction foil intended for flight might need to be known, but this would be subjecting a material 
designed to defract x-rays to x-rays.  For electronics flight hardware, the condition would be HRI1, for a metal foil, 
it would obviously be HRI4.   
 
The NASA Centers that deal with human space flight have several medical x-ray units.  It would be an inappropriate 
use of such equipment to look at flight hardware; therefore there should be no threat.  If one were to be used in such 
a manner, the threat would be to likely carry the same risk as a photographic x-ray; however, due to the incredible 
variety of medical x-ray units, a HRI2 should be assumed until a full analysis was performed, should such a peculiar 
need arise.   
 
Systems that fall under the heading of industrial x-ray equipment cover a broad category of devices typically used to 
inspect components of large systems that often can’t be moved easily or at all and are intended to inspect the 
structural integrity of the given component.  This equipment is usually fairly portable (on wheels or can be carried in 
several boxes) and intended for use in rugged environments (as opposed to a typical laboratory).  The power of such 
equipment varies widely depending upon the intended purpose.  Such equipment is used at various NASA Centers, 
primarily for the inspection of welds.  Such inspection work is routine with welds for flight equipment.  These 
inspections should take place prior to the installation of critical or sensitive components.  It is also common practice 
in industry to completely disassemble a unit if it is found that an x-ray weld inspection is necessary after integration.  
This is often as much an issue of getting the x-ray film in the right place as it is about protecting the equipment 
inside.  Should such an incident occur, one should be aware of this and plan accordingly.  For inspections with no 
flight hardware electronics present, the condition is HRI4.  The use of this equipment with hardware present should 
be considered HRI2 unless or until an appropriate review has been conducted to determine the actual risk.   
 
An entirely new type of x-ray producing device, known as a pyroelectric x-ray generator, has recently come onto the 
market.  This device generates a very small, variable intensity flux of x-rays by alternately heating and cooling a 
pyroelectric crystal that ejects electrons into a copper target to generate x-rays.  It is mentioned here because it is 
being investigated for flight as an x-ray source that requires little power and provides a reference.  There is no risk in 
ground applications, however it would be necessary to do an analysis for the devices that would be around it in the 
event it were flown.  Due to the relatively small output of the device, it’s condition is HRI3.   
 
Recommendations  
Remember, sources of x-rays are not dangerous unknowns, they are powerful tools like many others used at NASA 
on a daily basis, and tools must be respected.  Know what your flight hardware consists of and how it is affected by 
radiation so that you can make informed decisions about how it will be tested.  Know who is operating the x-ray 
equipment, what his or her training and experience level is, and what equipment is being used so that you can keep 
the dose as low as reasonably achievable and end with mission success.  As always, if there is a radiation concern 
that you or your team can’t answer, consult with a NASA radiation expert, that is what they are here for.   
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NASA 
Center Manufacturer Model 
Max. 
Potential 
(kV) 
Max. 
Current 
(mA) Device Function 
Risk to Flight 
Hardware Notes: 
Ames (incl. Moffet Field)       
 Siefert 3000 60 40 X-ray Diffraction HRI1 or HRI4   
 
General Electric Aristocrat II 150 300 Medical X-ray (HRI2) 
Human Use 
Only 
 
Lunar DPX-L 76 4.75 Medical X-ray (HRI2) 
Human Use 
Only 
 Faxitron   150 20 Shadowgraph N/A Inactive 
         Portable X-ray N/A Disassembled 
 
        Package X-ray HRI4 
Awaiting 
installation 
        
Dryden        
 Control Screening Dynavision 7555 160   Package X-ray HRI4  
 Equipment that is the property of the US Air Force at Dryden is not under the jurisdiction of NASA and is not applicable 
to this survey. 
        
Glenn        
 Philips / Muller MG 150 150   Radiography HRI3   
 Philips / Norelco MC 300 300   Radiography HRI3   
 Watkins / Johnson WJ 2346-2 75   Radiography HRI3   
 Watkins / Johnson WJ 2345-2 50   Radiography HRI3   
 Andrex A1622 150   Radiography HRI3   
 X-IT CMA-5 200   Radiography HRI3   
 Balteau GFD306 300   Radiography HRI3   
 Automation Sperry SPX 300 300   Radiography HRI3   
 Automation Sperry SPX 300 300   Radiography HRI3   
 
Bennett X-ray Corp. 
Compu-mAs, 
BXT-150W, BT-
7239  125 400 
Diagnostic 
Medical X-ray (HRI2) 
Human Use 
Only 
 Philips PW 1830 45   XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 Philips XRG-2500 45   XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 
Philips 
XRG-2500 
NASA#310413 30 20 XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 Bruker Analytical 
X-ray Systems 
APEX (s/n 
2410) 60 50 XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 
Philips 
X-ray System 
AXS 60 125 XRF HRI1 or HRI4   
 Philips PW2400     XRF HRI1 or HRI4   
 Rigaku Rotaflex 60 200 XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 
Philips 
MRD HRXRD 
(High 
Resolution 
XRD) 40 40 XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 Philips X'Pert, PW3040 50 40 XRD HRI1 or HRI4   
 
Nicolet XRD Corp Microx 2 60   
MicroFocus Real 
Time X-ray 
Tomography HRI3   
 
Philips MG164 160   
X-ray 
Radiography HRI3   
 
Trufocus   120   
X-ray 
Radiography HRI3   
 Fein Focus 
(tube/gen) 
FXE160 & 
SMARTSCAN  160   CT (HRI2) 
Human Use 
Only 
 American Science & 
Engineering 101 21ZZ 120 4 Package X-Ray  HRI4   
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NASA Center Manufacturer Model 
Max. 
Potential 
(kV) 
Max. 
Current 
(mA) Device Function 
Risk to Flight 
Hardware Notes: 
Goddard        
 Oxford XTF5011 50 1 X-ray diffraction HRI1 or HRI4   
 Rigaku RTPG-151 60 100 X-ray diffraction HRI1 or HRI4   
 Oxford XTF5011 50 1 X-ray diffraction HRI1 or HRI4   
 Manson 3B 10 0.2 Calibration source HRI4    
 
Amptek Cool-X 0-35 <33 Mini-source  HRI3 
9V battery 
powered 
 Pantak HF-2 75   Industrial X-ray N/A In storage 
 Lixi DVS-3000 70 15 RT X-ray HRI3   
 Torrex 150D 150 5 Cabinet X-ray HRI3   
 Fein Focus FXT-225.20 225 3 RT X-ray HRI3   
 Sperry 230 200 4 Film X-ray HRI3   
 
Kevex P160-10 160 1 
Detector 
Calibration HRI3   
        
IV &VF        
 This facility has no X-ray producing equipment at this time.      
        
Johnson (incl. White Sands Test Facility)      
 Fein Focus FXT-160-51 160 0.5 RT X-ray HRI3   
 Envision Products XR200 150 1   HRI3   
 Westinghouse X-06-805/4-7 125 300   HRI3   
 Phillips MG165m/2.25 160 10   HRI3   
 Sperry SPX-160EX 160 5   HRI3   
 Phillips XL30ESEM 30     HRI3 WSTF 
 Pantak HF-160 160 10   HRI3 WSTF 
 Phillips P6-300 300 5   HRI3 WSTF 
 Phillips P6-140 140 4   HRI3 WSTF 
 Phillips P6-301 300 5   HRI3 WSTF 
 C R Technology CRX2000 150   Cabinet X-ray HRI3   
 Hewelett Packard 43855B 125 3.5 Cabinet X-ray HRI3   
 Kevex XRF 770 60 3.3 Cabinet X-ray HRI3   
 JEOL (SEM) 6100 30   Cabinet X-ray HRI3   
 Rapiscan   160   Package X-Ray HRI4 WSTF 
 
EG&G Astrophysics 
SYS1071 
Linescan 160   Package X-Ray HRI4   
 E-Scan Conveyer Belt 160   Package X-Ray HRI4   
        
JPL        
 Torr X-RAY RADIFLEX-120     XRF HRI3  
 Rich-Siefert ISO VOLT 3 300 15 Radiographic CAB/SR HRI3  
 Siemens K310-H 60 60 Radiographic CAB/SR HRI3  
 SCIMTAG XDS-2000 60 50 XRD HRI1 or HRI4  
 LIXI LX-85-12505 125 1 XRD HRI1 or HRI4  
 Siemens D500 60 25 XRD HRI1 or HRI4  
 RDI  PA3-0 3000 1000 <10MeV accel. HRI1 or HRI4  
 ARC  01-0325-01 150 5 XRD HRI3  
 Philips PW1830125 60 60 XRD HRI3  
 AS & E AS&E-66Z 140 3 Package X-ray HRI4  
 Hamamatsu 
Photonics K.K. 
SKYSCAN 
1072 100 0.1 Radiographic CAB/SR HRI3  
 Fein-Focus FSX-160.32 160 1 XRD HRI3  
 Bruker G8 50 45 XRD HRI1 or HRI4  
 ARACOR 4100QTS 60 58 Radiographic CAB/SR HRI3  
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NASA Center Manufacturer Model 
Max. 
Potential 
(kV) 
Max. 
Current 
(mA) Device Function 
Risk to Flight 
Hardware Notes: 
Kennedy (incl. CCAFS)       
 Seifert 420 420 10   HRI3  
 Seifert 4002 420 10   HRI3  
 Seifert ES-2 420 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips MG 102L 100 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Baltospot BS-140 140 5 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 
Norelco 
PG200 
(HX549010) 200 5 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 
Scanray 
ACP-152 (CPL-
160) 160 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Norelco 140 140 5 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips MG102L 100 15 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Baltospot CM160 160 10   HRI3  
 IRT HOMX-161-X 160 3.2   HRI3  
 Philips MGC04 100 15 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Seifert Isovolt 160TL 160 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Seifert Isovolt 160TL 160 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips MGC04 100 15 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Quantachrome MSC-02 15 0.8 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 CMI XRX 50 1 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 Torrex 150 150 5 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 Seifert ES-2 100 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Pantak HF-255 200 7.1   HRI3  
 Andrex CP-580 200 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Andrex CP-580 200 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips MG-225-L 225 10 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips Dynafluor 70 6 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 EG&G Astro Linescan 160 1 Package X-ray HRI4  
 Philips PW-1830/40 60 60   HRI2  
 Kevex 770 60 3.3   HRI3  
 Pantak HF-320 320 5   HRI3  
 IRT Floriscan 1 160 2   HRI3  
 EG&G Astro 01-0421 160 0.8 Package X-ray HRI4  
 Varin 6000A 9000   Accelerator HRI2  
 Varin 3000A 9000   Accelerator HRI2  
 Varin 3000A 9000   Accelerator HRI2  
 Maganflux MXR-150A 150 5 Portable X-ray HRI3  
 Philips PW-2400 60 125   HRI2  
 Philips PW-188/10 60 40   HRI2  
 Hewlett Packard 43855A 110 3 Cabinet X-ray HRI3  
 AS&E 101ZZ 135 4 Package X-ray HRI4  
        
LARC        
 Pantak HF50 50 20 NDE HRI3  
 Balteau Electric Balteau 5-50 50 20 NDE HRI3  
 Automation/Sperry SPX-300C 300 10 NDE HRI3  
 Phillips MCN167 160 20 NDE HRI3  
 Automation/Sperry 160EA 160 5 NDE HRI3  
 Hewlett-Packard 804 110 3 Cabinet X-ray  HRI3  
 Hewlett-Packard  130 3 Cabinet X-ray  HRI3  
 Staveley Instruments THB 29293 160 10 NDE HRI3  
 
Scandanavian X-ray 
Scan-ray AC-
130-DC50 50 20 NDE HRI3  
 
Heimann Systems 
Hi-Scan HS 
6040i     Package X-ray HRI4  
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Risk to Flight 
Hardware Notes: 
Marshall        
 
Philips / Comet   320 15 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4 1.6kW limit 
 
Lorad   200 10 
Portable 
panoramic 
radiography tube HRI2 or HRI4 900W limit 
 
Kevex   125 0.5 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4 62.5W limit 
 
Philips   225 15 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4  
 
Pantak   160 30 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4 3.2kW limit 
 
Varian Linatron   
2MeV 
linac   
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4  
 
Pantak   420 30 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4 3.2kW limit 
 
Fein Focus   225 0.5 
Industrial 
radiography HRI2 or HRI4  
 
Tronix   150 4 
Portable 
radiography tube HRI2 or HRI4  
 Custom   0.2 800 All used inside 
beam tube at X-
ray calibration 
facility HRI1 or HRI4 
 
 Custom   32 10  
 Rigaku RU300 40 400  
 Rigaku RU300 40 400  
 
AXR-50 AXR-50 50 3 
Irradiator for 
secondary 
fluorescence HRI2 or HRI4  
 Faxitron   120 3 Cabinet system HRI3  
 Hewlett Packard 43855A 135 3 Cabinet system HRI3  
 Feinfocus FSX-100.26 100  X-ray microscope HRI3 20W limit 
 Trufocus/hybrid   75  X-ray microscope HRI3 30W limit 
 
Rigaku Ultrax 10  
X-ray 
crystallography HRI1 or HRI4 18kW limit 
 
Rigaku RU200 10  
X-ray 
crystallography HRI1 or HRI4 6kW limit 
 
Nonius FR591 10  
X-ray 
crystallography HRI1 or HRI4 6kW limit 
 
Comet MXR-160 160 7.5 Radiography HRI3 
Owned and 
operated by 
Boeing.  
 AS&E 66Z Micro Dose 140 3 Package X-ray HRI4  
 AS&E 66Z Micro Dose 140 3 Package X-ray HRI4  
 
Trufocus MPX125 125 2.5 
Irradiator for 
secondary 
fluorescence HRI2 or HRI4  
 Trufocus MPX50 50 2 Used for X-ray 
detector 
development & 
optics testing HRI2 or HRI4 
 
 Kevex P5010B 50 1  
 Oxford   100 1  
 Oxford   100 1  
 This list for Marshall EXCLUDES medical use X-ray equipment (HRI2).     
        
Michoud (Lockheed Martin)       
 This facility uses industrial x-ray equipment for the inspection of materials and welds.  These pose no threat to flight 
electronics and in this case should be considered HRI4.   
        
Stennis        
 AS&E 66Z Microdose 140 3 Package X-ray HRI4 AS&E 
 
